UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy
Law
Volume 3
Issue 1 Computer/Law Journal - 1981

Article 4

1981

Transborder Data Flow Regulation: Technical Issues of Legal
Concern, 3 Computer L.J. 105 (1981)
Eric J. Novotny

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science
and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric J. Novotny, Transborder Data Flow Regulation: Technical Issues of Legal Concern, 3 Computer L.J.
105 (1981)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl/vol3/iss1/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law by an authorized administrator
of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW
REGULATION: TECHNICAL ISSUES
OF LEGAL CONCERN*
by ERIC J. NovoTNyt
Thousands of private organizations and millions of individuals
depend on rapid and reliable international data communication for a
wide variety of services-airline reservations, foreign exchange and
funds transfers, management information, and scientific research.
Similarly, governments use high speed data links by satellite and
cable for military, diplomatic, and technical communications. These
types of international computer communications are known collectively as transborder data flows.'
The passage of fair information practices laws in Europe and in
North America, the tremendous advances in computer and telecommunications technology, and the expansion of information intensive
international commerce together have increased our attention to
data flow issues. In the late 1970s, this concern surfaced in the deliberations of international organizations such as the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the
Council of Europe. Although progress has been made in cooperative
* Research leading to the publication of this paper was supported by National
Science Foundation Grant MCS-77-24235 to the George Washington University. The
author wishes to thank Dr. Lance J. Hoffman for proposing and supporting this
inquiry. Points of view or opinions in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Science
Foundation or any other institution. A previous version of this paper was published
as Report No. GWU-EECS-80-10 of the George Washington University Research
Report Series, November 1980.
t Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Manager, Policy Analysis Department, International Communications
Services, Communications Satellite Corporation.
1. See generally 1 AMERiCAN FED'N OF INFORMATION PROCESSING SOC'YS, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOwS: CONCERNS IN PRIVACY PROTECTION AND FREE FLoW OF INFORMATION (R. Turn ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as AFIPS REPORT]; Novotny, Transborder

Data Flows and InternationalLaw: A Policy-Oriented Framework of Inquiry, 16
STAN. J. INT'L L. 141 (1980).
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fair information practices, other major issues as yet have eluded international conciliation.
Political and legal controversies surround the use and content of
transborder data flows, despite the steady growth, acceptance, and
recognized value of international computer data networks. Within
this context, only slight attention has been given to the technical issues and problems of transborder data flow regulation. 2 Policymakers need to examine more fully the technical problems of
transborder data flow regulation and to investigate the technical opportunities, constraints, and 'effects of restrictions on the international transmission of digital information.
I. A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A.

PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

The literature on transborder data flows contains discussions of
widely varying problems, partly due to the fact that data flows are
defined and categorized differently (or not at all) by various authors.
One must be able to separate data flows relating to international
computing activities from other forms of international telecommunication, e.g., voice telephony, TELEX, facsimile, and video. Many of
these forms of telecommunication were regulated successfully by
the international community for over one hundred years before the
introduction of modern digital computers. What makes today's
problems different?
To qualify as transborder data flows, the technical process must
involve: (1) transmission, (2) storage, and (3) computation. Traditional telegraphy and voice telephony by themselves provide transmission, but provide neither storage nor computation. 3 Data storage
provides economical access to large information files, and computation provides the necessary processing component to manipulate
the data. Without substantive data files or data bases and a computational function, data flows take on characteristics similar to other
forms of electronic communication. Telephone systems, for example, employ techniques that digitize voice transmissions. TELEX
2. AFIPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 117; see also Turn, Privacy Protectionand Security in TransnationalData Processing Systems, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L 67 (1980); Nelson & Reisman, Considerationof Privacy and Encryption in Persona4 National and
MultinationalCommunications, in PRoc. PAC. TELECOM. CONF., 2H.20 (1980); Norman,
A Schemefor Regulating TransborderData Flows, in TRANSNATIONAL DATA REGULATION: THE REALrrIES 12-1 (1979); Turn, Privacy and Security in TransnationalData
ProcessingSystems, 48 AFIPS CoNF. Pnoc., NAT'L COMPUTER CONF. 283 (1979).
3. V. COATES & B. FINN, A RETROSPECTIVE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: SUBMARINE

TELEGRAPHY 186 (1979).
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and facsimile systems also can employ digital channels. Yet handling all of these types of telecommunication the same way negates
the recent importance ascribed to computer-related data flows and
ignores the effect of the consequent national laws and international
proposals for regulating them. For example, a personally identifiable dossier can be transmitted easily across a national border via a
TELEX message. Such activities have taken place since the inception of such services, but the advent of computation and storage
have changed the stakes greatly.
Laws affecting personally identifiable data did riot appear until
the development of technologies involving data processing, data
storage, and transmission rates made it economical to transmit large
amounts of data in a short period. Data processing and storage facilities, located in one country, are beyond another country's supervision and regulation. 4 The benefits of increasing data flows and the
problems of eroding controls thus become divergent species. Content regulation over the border becomes one way of enforcing such
control in the absence of territorial jurisdiction.
Transborder data flows are, therefore, digitally encoded units of
information in which the transfer, storage, or processing takes place
in more than one nation state. The information can be transported
physically by magnetic media, e.g., tapes, disks, or transmitted electronically over a terrestrial line, submarine cable, or satellite link.
The most important fact is that the information transported or transmitted by these two modes either undergoes some type of data
processing, or is accessed across an international frontier. Although
a strict definition of data processing, as contrasted with data communication, has proved to be elusive,5 Seitz proposes a mathematical definition.6 He views data communication as a function in which
entropy is preserved without significant alteration of its content or
meaning. Data processing, on the other hand, changes the level of
entropy by transforming or manipulating the data. This view is sim4. As Smith writes:
When the source of the telecommunications is beyond the boundaries of the
State, problems of control arise that have yet to find an adequate solution in
terms of international law. It becomes necessary to distinguish between the
right of a state to do what it pleases within its own territory, and the claim of
that State to legally object to an activity originating beyond its borders but
which has an internal effect.
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION CONTROL 2 (1969).

5. Amendment of Section 67.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), 72 F.C.C.2d 368 (1979); Computer Inquiry, 28 F.C.C.2d 267
(1971).
6. Seitz, Data Communication and Data Processing-A Basisfor Definition, 5
TELECOM. POL'Y 49 (1980).
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flar to the IBM "encryption test" used to distinguish between data
7
communications and data processing.
At first glance, this distinction runs counter to prevailing notions that previously diverse types of telecommunication technologies are being merged into integrated services, and consequently
made indistinguishable. There is little doubt that new, high-capacity
facilities can attract voice, record, and data traffic integrated in the
same channels and made largely inseparable.
One may reject the notion, however, that integrating transmission media will allow diverse forms of telecommunication to be
treated the same. Governments have singled out computer-related
data flows for separate treatment. This trend will not diminish as
transmission media allow data communication to be integrated with
other services. Rather, the combination of different services actually
may lead to situations where data flows are identified and controlled
more aggressively.
What is different about the transborder data flows problem,
therefore, is that the information transmitted is changed at one or
more nodes in an end-to-end communication path. That change, in
the form of computation, occurs at some point before or after transmission from storage generates the data flows.

B. FouR GENERIC PROBLEMS
Some of the technical problems in transborder data flow regulation are expressed, solved, or affected by both the technologies of
data processing and of telecommunication. These problems include:
" Technical compliance with specific data protection or privacy
laws
* Attaining and maintaining data security
" Monitoring and surveillance of data flows
* Impacts on computer network planning
Each of these problems will be considered from the perspective of
the regulated and the regulating entity. The regulated entity may be
a multi-national enterprise, telecommunication carrier, computing
service bureau, or other organization that is the subject of data flow
regulation. The regulating entity is always a national government.
Each of these perspectives, regulated and regulating, contain
different and occasionally conflicting technical issues. One may afford technological opportunities, while another imposes constraints.
7. SEE In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Computer Inquiry), 64 F.C.C.2d 771 (1979) ("[A] service would be tariffed
only if the user could send encrypted information knowing that the information
would emerge at the addressee's location in the same encrypted form.")
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Decisions or legal policies may have technical implications for either
the regulated or regulating entities. Technical problems also may
have financial implications as their costs of implementation vary.
Compliance with specific privacy or fair information practices
laws embraces several technical problems. 8 Regulated entities, such
as multinational enterprises, have problems preventing unauthorized disclosure, accounting for third party disclosure, providing persons access to their own files, and complying with other familiar
provisions of privacy legislation. These privacy concerns can affect
system and data base design and, in an international context, 9 the
requirement that an organization observe more than one law when
engaging in transborder processing can cause further complications.
Some of these laws also contain security requirements that regulated entities must meet. Regulating entities often may conduct inspections or audits to see if compliance is observed. Sometimes,
however, for reasons independent of legal compliance with data protection laws, organizations use cryptographic methods to protect information during transborder transmission. There are often
technical problems in ensuring cryptographic protection when governmental restrictions inhibit the use of such technology by private
organizations.
Monitoring and surveillance of transborder data flows is another
generic problem for the regulating entity. Technical proposals have
been advanced, for example, to identify data flows with some type of
digital "license tag" to identify the source, content, value, and destination of such flows. 10 Some have argued that such surveillance is,
in practice, unworkable." Regulating entities, however, require
some surveillance techniques to police compliance with national
data flow policies.
Data flow restrictions also can have effects on the organizational
planning of computer and telecommunication networks. Of course,
overall planning takes place in the context of available and planned
telecommunication facilities; regulated entities, however, in re8. See generally,

PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN

INFORMATION SOCIETY, REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION,

app. 5

(Technology and Privacy) (1977); COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY IN THE NEx'r DECADE (L.

Hoffman ed. 1980).
9. See Gassmann, Privacy Implications of Transborder Data Flow, in COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY IN THE NEXT DECADE, supra note 8, at 109; SaflIrstein, How Do We

Best Control the Flow of ElectronicInformation Across Sovereign Borders?, 48 AFIPS
CONF. PROC. NAT'L COMPUTER CoNF. 279 (1979).

10. Norman, supra note 2, at 12-15.
11.

. POOL & R. SOLOMON, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOws: REQUIREMENTS FOR INTER-

NATIONAL COOPERATION 48 (1978).
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sponse to existing or anticipated restrictions on transborder data
flows, may be forced to change their plans for international networks.
C.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Other technical problems associated with transborder data flows
have not escaped notice. Among such allied topics are the problems
of international copyright or patent protection for software,' 2 of capacity planning, and of data transmission protocols and standards.
The recurring problem of competing definitions of data processing
and data communication has been mentioned previously. While
these are important and interesting problems in the international
use of information technology, they will not be discussed in detail.
Rather, this Article will attempt to cover issues that relate more directly to the use and content of the data flows themselves, and that
have not yet received extensive attention in the literature.
Another deliberate limitation of this Article is the omission of
technical problems inherent to general computer security issues.
There is abundant literature on security problems that have no appreciable differences in a local, national, or international context. 13
This Article concentrates on issues unique to international computing.
D.

TYPES OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOw MOVEMENTS

To better understand the technical aspects of transborder data
flow problems, several types of data flow patterns that may influence
a given regulatory situation will be discussed. These are shown in
Figure 1. For the purpose of this discussion, these generic types of
data transfers will represent portions of a given organization's netthat simplify actual, agwork structure, segmented into categories
4
gregate international flow traffic.'
Type 1 in Figure 1 describes a simple subsidiary reporting relationship. A subsidiary entity in country A transfers information
one-way to a headquarters user in country B. The headquarters
consolidates such data from a number of subsidiaries. One applica12. Id. at 56.
13. See Cerf & Kirstein, Issues in Packet-Network Interconnection, 66 IEEE Paoc.
1386 (1978); L. HOFFMAN, MODERN METHODS FOR COMPUTER SECURITY AND PRIVACY
(1977); Nelson & Reisman, supra note 2; Popek & Kline, Encryption and Secure Computer Networks, 11 COMPUTING SURVEYS 331 (1979).
14. Case studies of actual networks are available. See ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE USAGE OF INTERNATIONAL DATA NETWORKS IN EUROPE (1979) [hereinafter cited as OECD].
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FIGURE 1
TRANSBORDER DATA FLows CAN BE GROUPED
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tion of this type of data flow would be operational reporting by a
subsidiary business in country A to the main office in country B.
Some credit transactions take a similar path. A citizen of country B
who uses a credit card in country A will have a record of transaction
transferred to country B for processing and billing.
Distribution flow, the second type of transborder data flows, occurs when a centralized entity distributes data to several subsidiary
entities. These subsidiaries can also engage in their own local
processing. Applications of this type of flow include updates to local
files and data bases, orders and financial reports, and similar instructions or information transmitted to subordinate units. Consolidated data files typically are held in the headquarters country.
The third type of transborder data flows is common and involves
transnational processing, such as a service bureau arrangement.
Here, subscribers or users in one country use host computer facilities in another. Two-way traffic occurs since the main purpose of accessing the host is to use its computing facilities or data bases.
There may be dedicated applications, of course, as in an interactive
reservation system, but the pattern is essentially the same. Data
needed by subscribers in one country may reside with a host in another. One other variation would include a mailbox system or a
message-switching arrangement. A limited definition of data flows,
however, may exclude some store-and-forward message switching
due to the lack of a computational element.
A more complicated pattern, typified in practice by many
unique variations, is the multinational data network exemplified by
the fourth type diagrammed in Figure 1. Data flows are characterized by multiple-user, multiple-host interactions, where information
and processing can be centralized, distributed, or both. Large service bureaus or time sharing networks can operate in this fashion, yet
one should distinguish between a situation where the user or subscriber is dependent on computational or data base resources in another country, from that where the user has access to a
multinational network.
These examples illustrate very simply some generic types of
data flow patterns. The aggregate data flows actually may combine
several of these simplified component patterns. An important consideration is whether a particular type of data flow arrangement affects legal compliance problems. At a general level, regulatory
conditions and, hence, technical concerns, are influenced greatly by
the direction of the transmission, the geographic location of computation and storage functions, and, most importantly, the location of
the user.
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COMPLIANCE WITH NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION LAWS

An organization that collects, exchanges, or transfers personally
identifiable data (or in some countries data on legal persons), 15 such
as a multinational enterprise that transfers employee data, may be
regulated by the provisions of "data protection" or fair information
practices laws that sometimes restrict transborder data flows. A
regulated entity that operates within a given country is subject to
the applicable requirements imposed by that country's national data
protection law. Indeed, compliance requirements within each country may prove to be more expensive and restrictive for an organization than those restrictions imposed by transborder data flow
regulations. The general problems of compliance with domestic
laws and regulations are not treated here except insofar as extraterritorial users are concerned.
In the international context, a regulated entity faces two compliance problems:
1. National laws may prohibit, restrict, or control the transborder
transfer of personally identifiable information. An organization
that transfers data (as in Figure 1) may not be able to transfer
certain information in a specific direction for a specific purpose;
2. National laws may have different compliance requirements. An
organization that transfers personally identifiable information
across national boundaries could be subject to different compliance requirements that affect the overall design and operation
of a network or data base arrangement.
A.

ExPLIcrr RESTRICTIONS

ON TRANSBORDER DATA

FLows

Existing fair information practices laws are among the legal restrictions on transborder data flows that are based on the content
and use of the information being sent. Other restrictions that put
limitations on the entry, exchange, or exportation of computerprocessed data usually are related to telecommunication facility access, tariffs, standards compatibility, or national security.
Current French law 16 requires government approval to transmit
personally identifiable information outside France, but does not
otherwise deny extraterritorial processing. In Norway, 17 certain personal information cannot be transferred out of Norway without per15. Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Norway have provisions for legal persons. For a compendium see Novotny, Restrictions on the TransnationalFlow of Corporate Information, 7 EDP AUDITOR 13 (1979).
16. Act 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties, [1978] J.O. 227 (France).
17. Norwegian Act of 9th June 1978 Relating to Personal Data Registers (Nor-

way).
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mission of the King. Personal data processed by a service bureau
cannot be held by a private organization in Denmark. 18 In Austria,
there are no blanket restrictions against extraterritorial processing,
but approval to export personally identifiable data is required from
the Austrian Data Protection Commission (except in specified circumstances). 19 Prior approval for such transfers also is required
20
under Swedish law.
No comparable legal provisions exist in any United States statutes affecting information practices. The Canadian privacy law does
not impose such restrictions either.2 1 In those countries that restrict
transborder data flows, the thrust of the claim seems to be made in
the name of fair information practices, yet these restrictions leave
much to the discretion of administrative entities charged with legal
compliance. In most cases, the emphasis is on prior approval or licensing, and not on outright prohibitions on data flows. When this
observation is combined with an analysis of actual fair information
practices rules, the following observations emerge:
1. Organizations that engage in transborder data flows of personal
information are less likely to encounter unacceptable consequences from international data flow exchange restrictions than
from specific domestic compliance rules;
2. Since the emphasis of data flow restrictions seems to be on
prior approval, system designers can anticipate (based on past
approvals and disapprovals) the conditions under which approval is likely or unlikely.
On its face, it seems that the domestic features of fair information practices laws will have a greater impact on the operations of
multinational organizations than will prohibitions against transborder data flows. Transfers probably will be granted except in
cases of direct violation of established fair information practices
principles, or in cases where an organization attempts to evade one
country's laws. Consider this problem in more detail, as in Figure 2.
18. Private Registers Etc. Act, Act. No. 293 (1978) (Denmark).
19. In the following cases however, transfer by persons covered by Part 3
shall not require the consent of the Data Protection Commission: where the
person responsible for the data processing is himself the person affected by
the data transferred, or where the transfer is to a State which affords such
data comparable protection to that provided by this Act, or where so provided
by international agreement.
Data Protection Act, part 4, § 32(2) (1978), printedin BGB1 No. 565/1968 (translation
approved by the Austrian authorities) (Austria).
20. Data Act, § 11 (1973) (Sweden).
21. An Act to Extend the Present Laws in Canada that Proscribe Discrimination
and that Protect the Privacy of Individuals, 2d sess., 30th Parl., 25 Eliz. 1I (1978) (assented to 14 July 1977) (Canadian Human Rights Act, c. 33, Can. Stat. 887 (1977)).
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FIGURE 2
COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS CAN RESULT WHEN TRANSACTIONS

AND PROCESSING TAKE PLACE IN MULTIPLE
JURISDICTIONS

(Personally identifiable information about a citizen of Country "A")
Information is collected in:
Information is
transferred for
processing or
storage to:

COUNTRY A

COUNTRY B

A

No transborder data
flows occur. Country
A's laws apply.

Country B's transborder
transfer restrictions may
apply, but Country A's domestic laws may apply to
citizens of Country A when
the data are in Country A.
Country B's laws may apply
at the time of collection
while in Country B, but
only if Country A's citizens
are covered.

B

Country A's transborder transfer restrictions may apply,
but Country B's domestic laws apply if a
citizen of Country A
is under the jurisdiction of Country B's
laws.

A citizen of Country A has
no protection under Country A's laws. If Country B's
domestic laws do not extend to citizens of Country
A, then Country B's laws
may not apply either.

Figure 2 exemplifies the difficult and complicated nature of technical fair information compliance in an international context. One
overriding complication arises in applying the laws of country B to
data concerning a citizen of country A that is collected in country A
and processed or stored in country B. To protect citizen A's fair information rights, country A must supervise the exportation of data
from country A to country B. In this situation, country B's fair information practices laws would apply to a citizen of country A. If country B's laws do not afford protection comparable to that guaranteed
by country A's laws, data flow restrictions can result. For reasons of
national security, jurisdiction, and international custom, a country
cannot always grant citizens of a foreign state the same legal protection it offers its own citizens.
Further, when citizens of country A have, information collected
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about them in country B that is also processed in country B, they
tend to lose protection of country A's fair information practices.
Only when citizens of A have recognized rights under country B's
laws would the provisions of country B's laws apply.
One solution to these multiple compliance problems might be to
apply those legal provisions that are technically enforced at the
place where the information is collected, or where the transaction
takes place. Cross-border data processing, however, causes
problems with this legal principle:
1. If citizens in country A request information about themselves in
a data processing system in country B, country B's transborder
data flow restrictions could prevent such a transfer, thus negating A's laws;
2. Even if citizens in country A could exercise their rights to data
in country A, that data could be consolidated with other data
collected in country B in the same fie or even in the same record when shipped to country B. Would the two sets of laws
each govern their respective pieces of the record?
These issues might seem at first to be rather arcane and narrow,
but as personally identifiable transborder data flows are involved in
increasing numbers of international business transactions, the
problems of compliance become important. The first step in technical compliance is to isolate the jurisdiction of the particular law in
question, if any. In certain instances no national laws may apply to
information collected on a citizen of country A in country B and
processed in country B.
Compliance is simple to determine in one directional ("type 1")
processing where the "user" in country A obtains information about
a citizen of country B that is then transmitted to the "home" country, B, for processing. This type of processing is typical of international credit card operations. Compliance with the home country's
fair information practice laws is all that is necessary.
In type 2 flows, both the initial user and the processing host are
located in one country so data export restrictions are the only rules
that menace this type of data flow. In this instance, the fair information practices legislation of the initial user's country would be observed, including any restrictions on transborder data flows. This
situation is analogous to a situation where a corporation's subsidiary in country A transmits information about employees and customers to a headquarters in country B. As long as data export
restrictions are followed (and these have been shown to be fairly
mild), there should be little or no difficulty in transmitting that information.
In two-way data transfers, however, the situation can be very
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different. Type 3 flows, which are labeled transnational networks,
involve users located in country A who have collected or are using
information on citizens of country A. Processing is done in country
B, but there are no users, at least no authorized ones, located there.
As long as the only purpose for transmission to country B is for data
processing, then requiring the user in country A to comply with fair
information practices laws of country A should be sufficient. The geographic location of the user of the data, therefore, is very important
for enforcing fair information laws in a transborder processing
scheme.
When there are users in both countries, as in type 4 flows, the
compliance situation is much more complicated. This case is analogous to decentralized data processing in which dispersed users send
and receive information from several hosts in an international network. Conflicts of law problems can be avoided by using distributed
systems that partition users and hosts.2 Specific information would
be loaded "downline" in hosts for specific uses in one country. Compliance procedures can then be implemented for each applicable
distributed system. Consolidated information that does not violate
transborder data flow restrictions can be transmitted to a host in another country, presumably the headquarters; the location of the user
should determine which data flow restrictions to apply. In this way,
the organization could realize the benefits of centralized reporting
and meet individual country compliance requirements. It is uncertain as yet whether partitioning users and hosts would lead to unacceptable sacrifices in network efficiency.

B. COMPLIANCE wrH SPECIFIC FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES
It would require considerable space to make a comparison of
the specific requirements in the fair information practices laws of
the ten countries that have adopted them. Such comparisons are already available. 23 Do the provisions of fair information practices
legislation have special ramifications, costs, or other technical effects in an international context?
As discussed above, one-way transfers of personal information,
while being subject to exportation restrictions, are bound primarily
by the national compliance rules of the originating country. When
information is centralized, dispersed users in various countries may
22. The international community has responded to the choice-of-laws problem by
adopting in the OECD a set of voluntary fair information guidelines for transborder
data flows. See, e.g., Draft Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, DSTI/ICCP/79.40 (1979).
23. AFIPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 64; Novotny, supra note 15.
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be compelled to observe different compliance requirements. These
requirements would
1. Allow affected persons to inspect and amend their records or to
correct errors;
2. Require that disclosures to third parties be recorded and made
available; corrections or amendments to records must be communicated to organizations (third parties) that have received
the original record;
3. Observe specific security rules to prevent unauthorized disclosure or modification of a data subject's record;
4. Enforce other specific fair information practices policies.
Any centralized system that processes personalized information
in compliance with the first two requirements most likely will increase its processing costs if inspection, amendment, and third party
disclosure accounting procedures are initiated at the user terminal
level but handled through the centralized host. Transmission costs
will reflect such increases, but normally will not be significantly
large as long as the volume of requests is small. The organization
will have to compare the costs of performing some localized processing against the transmission costs of type 3 or type 4 flows. Also, in
the centralized system concept, there may be different fair information rules that apply to the same data base, thus requiring records
to be segregable according to nationality.
III. ATAINING AND MAINTAINING DATA SECURITY
By far the most cumbersome compliance problem in the international context is attaining and maintaining data security. Here,
we are concerned with requirements set forth in national fair information practices laws and drafts from international conventions.
The provisions in most of these rules use language that implies
striking a balance between the risks of disclosure, modification, and
so forth, and the costs of implementing such controls or of supervising their administration. Hence, the use of words such as "reasonable," "appropriate," and "necessary," in describing the preferred
level of security. Typically, a regulated entity will attempt to enforce security controls in those areas that have substantial risks to
the organization's operation or integrity, at least to the extent of
management's attention to security matters. In the face of external
rules that require security compliance at an unspecified level, regulated entities are subjected heavily to the discretionary judgment of
data protection authorities. Regulated entities are compelled, therefore, to find that level of security that maximizes compliance while
minimizing the costs of compliance.
The problems for the regulating entity are twofold:
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1. The regulating entity must determine a set of specific compliance requirements that approximate the "necessary" and "reasonable" levels of security according to generally subjective
judgments;
2. The regulating entity must allocate its enforcement resources to
minimize the chances of violations.
Together, the problems of finding adequate or optimal levels of
protection and surveillance have eluded both theorists and practitioners. Finding an optimal level of protection is not yet quantitatively demonstrable, particularly when defenses must incude
physical, administrative, and technical security. 24 Knowing that one
cannot yet attain "perfect" security, data protection authorities are
compelled either to adopt arbitrary rules or to make rough estimates
of where controls should be implemented by using risk assessment
techniques. At the present time, there are substantial methodological limitations to such risk assessment techniques. While there
have been some strides made in improving security evaluation
methods, many problems have yet to be overcome.
In addition to complying with the data security provisions of national fair information practices legislation, multinational organizations occasionally protect their transmissions against electronic
interception. One recent survey of European data networks 25 indicated that the number of commercial users employing cryptographic
technologies is still very low. Most commercial, encrypted, international data traffic concerns funds transfers or intracorporate
messages. Governmental communications use cryptography extensively. Techniques to protect against modification or message retransmission also can use authentication techniques in addition to,
or in place of, cryptography; cryptography, however, probably will
be more popular and more convenient to implement.
The first question asked about cryptographic protection is usually, "Against what threats is the technique to be used?" Cryptographic defenses may be very effective against commercial
espionage and would-be computer-assisted criminals, but a regulated entity may encounter legal restrictions if it seeks to protect its
data transmissions against governmental interception. National authorities with the technological capabilities have engaged in electronic surveillance of data traffic for intelligence-gathering
purposes. 2 6 To facilitate the acquisition of such data traffic, and to
24. Glaseman, Turn & Gains, Problem Areas in Computer Security Assessment, 46
AFIPS CoNF. PRoc. NAT'L COMPUTER CONF. 105 (1977).

25. See OECD, supra, note 14.
26. See Kahn, Cryptology Goes Public, 58 FOREIGN
COMB, PRIVATE AND PuBLIc DEFENSES AGAINST SOVIET

AFFAIRS 141 (1979); G. LIPSINTERCEPTION OF U.S. TELE-
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prevent foreign adversaries from concealing their transmissions,
such national authorities can demand that:
1. No cryptographic
protection be used in commercial data trans27
mission;
2. The encryption key(s) be disclosed to government authorities
prior to and during use by a commercial or private organization;
3. The cryptographic methods or algorithms used by private organizations be restricted to particular types prescribed by govern28
mental authorities.
In the United States, although domestic uses of cryptography
are not forbidden outright, inventors of certain cryptographic devices and methods have encountered patent and other restrictions,
particularly in the name of national security. 29 There also has been
a widely-publicized controversy about the Data Encryption Standard.3 0 These issues are particularly difficult to assess since much
of the technology and practice is shrouded in extreme secrecy. It is
not yet known, for example, whether the low usage of cryptographic
techniques in international communication by private organizations
is due to its discouragement by governments, to a perceived lack of
need by commercial organizations, or to the difficulty of technical
implementation. The potential international user of cryptographic
protection finds matters complicated further because he must comply with the laws of both countries involved in the data transmission. 31 Approval must be bilateral for such use. Thus, in the United
States, where controls are not strictly required, an organization desiring to set up encrypted communications must obtain permission
from the other country involved. Often this cannot be done. If one
country disallows the use of cryptography, the link cannot be protected.
IV.

MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE

Regulating entities must have some means of enforcing transborder data flow regulations and policies. In addition to conducting
audits, holding security inspections, and enforcing reporting rePROBLEMS AND POLICY POINTS (1979); Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Gov't Information and Individual Rights, Comm. on Gov't Operations,
94th Cong., 1st &2d Sess. (1975-76).
27. This is usually in national telecommunications regulations.
28. Kahn, supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. Diffie & Hellman, Exhaustive Cryptanalysisof the NBS Data Encryption Standard, 10 COMPUTER 74 (1977); Kolata, Computer Encryption and the National Security
Agency Connection, 197 SCL 438 (1977).
31. Nelson & Reisman, supra note 2; Norman, supra note 2, at 12-5 to 12-6.
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quirements of regulated entities, authorities can monitor the data
traffic itself. Pool and Solomon argue that such surveillance is not
practical. 32 Intelligence agencies nonetheless have employed highly
sophisticated software to identify, sort, and sift through massive
amounts of raw, electronically-produced data. 33 These same agencies, in technologically-advanced countries, such as the United
States, have pioneered computer technology related to their surveillance missions34 and, therefore, have well-developed capabilities. It
is relatively easy to identify international data traffic because:
1. In some countries, a private organization must obtain, by regulation, certain terminal equipment from a regulating entity
before using the public network for data transmission. This action discloses that the user intends to transmit or receive digital
information.
2. If a dedicated data line is leased to the user, this is also disclosed to and regulated by the telecommunication administration, and can be subject to restrictions on use.
3. Domestic networks typically feed international gateway switches where incoming or outgoing traffic is concentrated. At these
points, surveillance can take place effectively.
This is not to say, however, that monitoring a large amount of
international data traffic is elementary. There are substantial expenses involved in widespread surveillance activities. Only governmental authorities that are charged with national security
responsibilities in technologically advanced countries have the resources to intercept this traffic usefully. Thus, it is possible that
monitoring data flows is not so much a technological problem as one
of governmental priorities. To the extent that transborder data flows
represent a valuable source of strategic information, the temptation
to collect such data will be strong, but investment in such a dramatic program to monitor data flows in order to enforce laws such as
those relating to fair information practices is probably not likely and
could be supplanted by other means of enforcement. It would seem
logical for the regulating entity, therefore, to monitor suspicious
targets selectively, rather than to gather large amounts of international data traffic indiscriminately in the hope of finding a violation.
Another proposal for technical enforcement would be to include
a stream of identifying information in the transmission sequence of
32. I. POOL & R. SOLOMON, 3 PoucY IMPLICATIONS OF DATA NETWORK DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OECD AREA 79 (1980).
33. Kahn, supra note 26; Surveillance Technology, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
34. Snyder, Computer Advances Pioneered by Cryptologic Organizations, 2 ANNALS OF THE HIST. OF COMPUTING 60 (1980).
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a given message or data packet, i.e., an electronic "license tag. ' 35 By
capturing the contents of this identifying information, the source,
destination, and clues to the information content in the bulk of the
data could be determined. This proposal has, however, at least
three serious problems.
First, strict standardization would be necessary to implement
such a scheme. Data could be collected at a terminal session, attached to a data packet, or transmitted with each burst. Complications would be great because of the mixture of traffic that typically
characterizes international multiplexed transmissions. Given the
differences that exist over interface standards and protocols, it is
difficult to conceive how consensus could be reached on a standard
identifier. Further, it may only be possible to implement "data tagging" within a network similar to type 4 in Figure 1, and only when
that network itself is constructed with strict internal standards. A
regulating authority would have to identify those networks that require surveillance and that have the required rigor to be monitored
in this way. Public data networks, such as those being planned or
used in many Western European countries, would be likely choices,
but no large scale plans seem to be developing in this regard.
A second problem is the attention given to messages and packets of data. It might be more effective to keep track of access and
use of data files and data bases than to monitor every transborder
transaction. Data protection laws typically license, register, or regulate data contained in fies, and not transactions. Monitoring such
transactions, such as funds transfers, could be feasible. Most international transactions of this type, however, are sent and received in
a structured format anyway; there is no need to add redundant identifying data by tagging.
A third difficulty with such message identification is the price
paid in increased transmission costs and in the degradation of network performance. Studies done on the effects of adding error correction bits to data transmission packets have shown that including
36
parity bits can add over ten percent to the size of a given packet.
Performance degradation also can occur. Adding three bits to an
eight-bit/character synchronous line roughly equals the savings in
converting from an eleven-bit/character asynchronous line, but
three bits is not sufficient for tagging. Assuming that the identifying
information was to include approximately ten characters, a packet
size of one hundred characters still would be inflated by ten percent.
35. Norman, supra, note 2, at 12-5.
36. Kimbleton & Schneider, Computer Communications Networks: Approaches,
Objectives, and Performance Considerations,7 COMPUTING SURVEYS 129 (1975).
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V. EFFECTS ON PLANNING
The effects of data flow regulation on computer and communications planning was alluded to earlier in this Article. Others have ex37
amined data flow problems in the context of capacity planning.
Data flow restrictions might also influence an organization's network
design, particularly its centralization or decentralization. Most of
the current controversy still focuses on potential restrictions of operational, financial, or scientific data. To the extent that such restrictions were enforced, it would amount to a denunciation of these
activities. Perhaps controls on data flows would be incidental to direct controls on trade and commercial activities that cause concern.
More likely is a situation where dependence on certain types of
processing, as in the service bureau case, will be managed by controlling facility access and tariffs. Surveillance also may afford a
better tool against the regulated entities than would overt data flow
restrictions.
This observation leads one to the tentative conclusion that multinational organizations engaging in data flows might consider some
type of decentralization of facilities or data bases. This is especially
relevant when some information is permitted to flow while other information is controlled. Registration may begin to discriminate
among types of data and place different requirements on different
segments of an organization's total data resources. As such, regulated entities must weigh the economics of centralized processing
against compliance with each country's data protection laws.3 8 This
strategy may run counter to economic considerations or improved
reliability (achieved dynamically through workload distribution by
way of a multi-host network, rather than through static assignment
of redundant processing resources). Clearly, in the face of increased data flow barriers, a multinational data flow network could
be difficult to manage efficiently. One possible solution might be to
promote the establishment of an interconnection standard to link
domestic systems along clearly defined and controlled paths. Countries could then promote interconnection of national or even private
networks, while still supporting geographically distributed data bases or computing resources.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined a few of the near-term technical and
37. L Pool & R. Solomon, supra note 11, at 32.
38. Sood, PersonalPrivacy: Can the MNC's Afford to Respect It?, 14 COLUM. J.
WoRLD Bus. 42 (1979).
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legal questions raised by transborder data flow regulation. Significant questions remain for further analysis. Comprehensive information about data flow patterns and compliance problems is not yet
available.
From the technical perspective, there are at least three issues
that merit further research:
Data Network Interconnection-As national data networks, both
public and private, begin to grow, there undoubtedly will be increased needs for international interconnection. Standards and
protocols will be of concern, yet compliance, security, and surveillance questions will be of considerable importance and will become
more complicated. Integrated data services that combine many
forms of telecommunication will blur the traditional service distinctions and continue to raise definitional questions regarding data
processing and data communication.
Software Protection-As international networking and the general
progress of data processing increases, software systems will become more suitable for exporting and shared use in multiple countries. Copyright and patent protection for this aspect of data flow
will require resolution.
Impact on Systems Design-As data restrictions spill over into issues involving dependency, vulnerability, and economic advantage,
network and database designers will have to respond to national
laws and regulations that require decentralization.
One can expect that technical considerations in transborder
data flows will continue to be intertwined with political and legal issues. No doubt the increased use of computer communication systems on an international level will not diminish either the political
controversies or the technical problems. There are also some obvious normative questions involving the free flow of information and
other international legal principles that involve United States foreign policy and comity among nations. Isolating these problems
from the practical concerns of legal and technical compliance will
not solve them. Rather, one must gain an appreciation and insight
into the application of broad political principles into the routine
practices of transborder data flows. An important aspect of future
cooperation and conflict in international telecommunications will
rest on this application of broad political principles.

